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Abstract— Goal: As the Coronavirus Pandemic of 2019/2020 
unfolds, a COVID-19 ‘Immunity Passport’ has been mooted as a 
way to enable individuals to return back to work. While the 
quality of antibody testing, the availability of vaccines, and the 
likelihood of even attaining COVID-19 immunity continue to be 
researched, we address the issues involved in providing tamper-
proof and privacy-preserving certification for test results and 
vaccinations.  Methods: We developed a prototype mobile phone 
app and requisite decentralized server architecture that 
facilitates instant verification of tamper-proof test results. 
Personally identifiable information is only stored at the user’s 
discretion, and the app allows the end-user selectively to present 
only the specific test result with no other personal information 
revealed. Behind the scenes it relies upon (a) the 2019 World 
Wide Web Consortium standard called ‘Verifiable Credentials’, 
(b) Tim Berners-Lee’s decentralized personal data platform 
‘Solid’, and (c) a Consortium Ethereum-based blockchain. 
Results: Our mobile phone app and decentralized server 
architecture enable the mixture of verifiability and privacy in a 
manner derived from public/private key pairs and digital 
signatures, generalized to avoid restrictive ownership of sensitive 
digital keys and/or data. For the test certificate Holder, Issuer 
(e.g. healthcare staff, pharmacy) and Verifier (e.g. employer), it is 
‘just another app’ which takes only minutes to use. Conclusions: 
The app and decentralized server architecture offer a prototype 
proof of concept that is readily scalable, applicable generically, 
and in effect ‘waiting in the wings’ for the biological issues, plus 
key ethical issues raised in the discussion section, to be resolved. 
 
Index Terms—blockchain, COVID-19, coronavirus, 
decentralized, immunity certification. 
 
Impact Statement— As soon as COVID-19 antibody testing, 
vaccines, and likelihood of immunity surpass quality thresholds, 
our tamper-proof and privacy-preserving certification can be 
rapidly deployed. Our approach is applicable to any certification 
scenario. 
 
 
Submitted April 20, 2020, revised May 22, 2020. This work is funded by 
the UK Government Office for Students’ Institute of Coding and two projects 
funded under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme: QualiChain (grant agreement number 822404) and DEL4ALL 
(871573).  
All authors are with Knowledge Media Institute, The Open University, 
Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, UK. *(Correspondence e-mail: kmi-
director@open.ac.uk) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE Coronavirus/COVID-19 pandemic of 2019/2020 is 
still taking its terrible toll as we write this [1]. Tests for 
the presence of antibodies could offer a way for people who 
can prove COVID-19 immunity to go back to work [2], [3]. 
There are, however, challenges concerning the biological 
premise of ‘immunity’: the strength and longevity of COVID-
19 immunity after infection are matters of current debate and 
research, as are the sensitivity and robustness of the relevant 
tests [4], [5] and the race to develop a viable vaccine [6], [7].  
Given the scale of the pandemic and financial fallout, it is 
plausible that ‘COVID-19 antibody test / vaccination 
certification’ (henceforth ‘CAT/VC’), if shown to be robust, 
will be in great demand. Bearing in mind the legal and ethical 
implications of such certification, raised in [8], [9] and our 
Discussion, we feel that for either the current pandemic or a 
pandemic of the future, the concept of certification has a 
place, particularly when the recipient is employed in 
healthcare or other key sectors.  
But what form should certification take? A signed or 
stamped letter is the centuries-old default, and straightforward 
to roll out at scale, as long as there is some point-of-test proof 
of identity.  Our approach is based on the view that for such a 
sensitive and likely high-value certificate, a paper version is 
too vulnerable to alteration or forgery (an exception arises in 
environments that are ‘lower tech’ for socio-economic reasons 
and we later describe a printed certificate to address this case). 
A digital certificate makes the most sense, provided that it can 
be: (i) Privacy-preserving (because as proud as the holder 
might be of new-found ‘immunity’, personal data can be re-
purposed in unpredictable ways [10]), (ii) un-forgeable, (iii) 
easy to administer, (iv) easily verifiable while still preserving 
privacy, (v) scalable to millions of users, and (vi) cost-
effective.  
All of this effort would be wasted without public 
acceptance, which is increasingly challenging in an era of 
suspicion about data-collecting apps [11]. Toward this end, we 
argue not only for the decentralized approach underlying our 
design and implementation below, but also for its benefits in 
allowing individuals who have been tested to change their 
minds and quit the scheme, knowing that even 
cryptographically encoded data will be ‘orphaned’ (no data 
pointing to it), rendering it meaningless. Also, in the 
Supplementary Materials, we emphasize the importance of 
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Fig. 2. Steps in testing, certification, and verification, showing a Solid Pod 
(hexagon) hosted on the Holder’s mobile phone (labels A, E, F), with minimal 
hash storage for verification. The circles at B depict replicated blockchain 
nodes on multiple servers, receding into the distance. 
having strong oversight by an ethics watchdog to ensure best 
endeavours to avoid unleashing a Pandora’s Box of 
undesirable side-effects.  
How best to undertake such a challenge?  Modern 
smartphone apps and several key technologies such as public 
key cryptosystems and immutable blockchain records offer 
some tantalizing prospects for the path we envisage, if they 
can satisfy the above criteria.  Below, we look at the methods 
by which this can be achieved, assuming a scenario involving 
testing by a known authority (e.g. a healthcare practitioner or 
pharmacist), as opposed to self-testing at home. This main 
paper assumes an ‘On-Site Test for Antibodies + Issuance of 
Digital Certificate Including Photo ID’ in order to explain our 
approach, and in the Supplementary Materials we describe 
variations for  (a) ‘Issuing Digital Certificate Without Photo 
ID’, (b) ‘Issuing Paper Certificate’, (c) ‘Off-Site Testing Via 
External Lab’, and (d) ‘Vaccination + Certification’      
II. METHODS  
We focus on the design and implementation of a prototype 
mobile phone app and requisite decentralized server 
architecture, intended to facilitate verification of tamper-proof 
test results. Our design involves a novel hybrid architecture 
based on (a) the 2019 World Wide Web Consortium standard 
called ‘Verifiable Credentials’, (b) Tim Berners-Lee’s 
decentralized personal data platform ‘Solid’, and (c) a 
Consortium Ethereum-based blockchain. We work through (d) 
a plausible use case scenario, then (e) describe the key 
‘onboarding’ and certification steps in detail; and (f) provide 
benchmark tests to anticipate scaling performance.  
A. ‘Verifiable Credentials’ for digital certification 
Verifiable Credentials [12] is a W3C standard that builds 
upon Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), the public/private key 
pairs that facilitate digital signatures in widespread use today. 
The W3C extensions standardize the definitions of document 
formats to make them machine-readable and communicable, 
and to generalize PKI, which tends to be costly and highly 
centralized. The generalization involves a decentralized 
registry for cryptographic keys, typically residing in a 
blockchain — this allows every public key to have its own 
unique address, known as a Decentralized Identifier (DID). 
The key roles and transactions, adapted for our specific use 
case, are illustrated in Fig. 1. 
The ‘Issuer’, in our case a trusted pharmacy or the UK 
National Health Service (NHS), can issue credentials such as 
blood test results and vaccination certificates. ‘Holders’ 
(typically citizen end-users) can store them in their own 
preferred way, for example in digital wallets that are part of a 
mobile phone app. ‘Verifiers’, such as employers, or 
establishments seeking proof of some attribute, can ask the 
Holder to present such proof concerning these credentials. 
Verifiers also check digital signatures against what is known 
as a ‘verifiable (decentralized) data registry’: this is the 
blockchain where the DIDs mentioned above reside. 
B. ‘Solid’: Decentralized Personal Data 
We pointed out in [13] that the over-centralization of data, 
particularly its consolidation into ‘silos’ by brand-name IT 
services and social network providers, is of increasing 
concern. Decentralization is an ideal starting point for storing 
sensitive data, including medical, financial, and other personal 
data — but only if security and privacy are significantly better 
than what can be offered by traditional centralized systems. 
We identified a promising approach to widespread 
deployment, known as Solid, initiated by Sir Tim Berners-Lee 
[14], [15]. Solid aims to decentralize the Web by transferring 
control of data from a central authority to users, thereby 
allowing users to retain complete ownership of their data, 
which they store in what are called ‘Solid Pods’ — analogous 
to a personal web server that is hosted either locally on a 
mobile phone, or hosted with a cloud provider of the 
individual’s choice, or both. The key distinction from 
centralized approaches is that even in the provider-hosted 
case, the provider’s access to the data is limited by the user’s 
preferences. 
In [16] we proposed an approach combining Solid Pods and 
distributed ledgers, of the type familiar to the blockchain 
community, to facilitate the complete decentralization of data. 
The key ingredients of this combination are illustrated in Fig. 
2, which also provides an overview of the main 
 
Fig. 1. Main roles and workflow in W3C Verifiable Credentials [12], adapted 
for our COVID-19 Antibody Testing use case. 
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test/certify/verify life cycle. Our methods give users total 
control over their data while maintaining the integrity of the 
stored information through blockchain-based verification. 
As in Fig. 1, the ‘Holder’ is the primary individual who is 
self-motivated to obtain the certificate of COVID-19 antibody 
test results in order to be admitted to a workplace or other 
location. Holders own, manage, and control their own Solid 
Pods (shown as hexagons in the Holder’s mobile phone in Fig. 
2 at A, E, and F), which contain their personal data. In Fig. 2, 
our Holder’s Solid Pod contains a elements of a physical ID 
such as a driving license (‘thumbprint’ icon at A) and the 
Holder’s signed and countersigned certificate of COVID-19 
antibody test results — represented in Fig. 2 as a document in 
which is embedded a special QR code (F). The Holder is free 
to store the Solid Pod data on his/her mobile phone, on a 
personal favorite cloud provider, or both (we only show the 
mobile phone version for simplicity). At any time, Holders can 
move or delete data, as it remains under their ownership. One-
way encoded ‘hashes’ of the data (only a few bytes in size) are 
held, as shown by the dashed arrows in Fig. 2 (E and H), on a 
blockchain to support independent verification. 
C. Consortium Blockchain  
In our design, we use a ‘Consortium blockchain’, shown in 
Fig. 2 (B) as circles (depicting multiple replicated blockchain 
nodes receding into the distance): this is not a fully public 
blockchain like Ethereum or Bitcoin, but rather a blockchain 
shared specifically by a Consortium of known providers who 
have signed up to the Ethics Guidelines we describe in the 
Discussion Section.  The Open University-led Consortium 
blockchain is a private Ethereum network known as 
OpenEthereum (formerly Parity Ethereum) [17], [18] which 
uses a ‘Proof of Authority’ consensus mechanism [19] 
wherein several nodes can be in the mutually-agreed 
privileged position of being allowed to confirm transactions. 
As we go to press, our Consortium blockchain comprises 
nodes run by The Open University, BT, Condatis, Inrupt, and 
the Chiba Institute of Technology near Tokyo, with expansion 
planned as our prototype implementation is scaled up via other 
large-company partnerships now under discussion. This 
approach contrasts with that of Bitcoin and other early 
blockchains which use the slow and ecologically unfriendly 
Proof of Work, wherein massive computing power enables 
nodes to have a better chance of confirming transactions.  The 
Consortium approach gives us the kind of distributed 
scalability that increases security, but without the widespread 
public availability that may serve as a disincentive for 
individuals to participate.  
D. Use case scenario 
In our scenario, the Issuer (Pharmacy) needs to authenticate 
that the Holder is who they say they are, and thus requests that 
the Holder display (a) a physical ID, such as a Driving License 
or a Passport, and (b) a QR code which is scanned by the 
Issuer using the Issuer’s mobile phone app, both of which are 
shown in Fig. 2 (C).  At this point the Issuer taps to accept the 
ID, and the Holder’s photo is ‘burned’ into the upcoming steps 
so that at the final step of verification there will be no need to 
display the same physical ID. 
2. The blood test is performed, and the certificate with 
results is issued as soon as the results are available (off-site lab 
tests are dealt with in the Supplementary Materials). The 
Issuer (first scanning a printed QR code if preferred) generates 
a digitally-signed test result as a new QR code (labelled D in 
Fig. 2) for transmission to the Holder, thereby providing a 
Verifiable Credential which is digitally signed by both the 
Issuer and the Holder, and stored on the Holder’s Solid Pod 
(Fig. 2, D and E). At label E we also see that a hash of the 
Verifiable Credential is stored on the Consortium blockchain 
to facilitate verification at step 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Issuer onboarding timeline details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Holder onboarding timeline details. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Verifier onboarding timeline details. 
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3. The Holder can now present a provably valid certificate 
to the Verifier. To avoid someone else impersonating the 
Holder, the Holder’s ID photo was already ‘burned’ into the 
digital certificate at Step 1, so the Holder needs to present only 
the QR code (F and G in Fig. 2) 
At H in Fig. 2 we see that the Verifier’s app automatically 
verifies both digital signatures and the certificate against the 
hash stored on the Consortium blockchain, and confirms 
acceptance of the COVID-19 Antibody Test Certificate. The 
certificate stores quantitative test results, such as antibody type 
(e.g. ‘IgG’) and level, so it is up to the Verifier’s own 
contextually guided procedures to decide whether to admit the 
Holder, for example, to work. 
E. Primary design (Onboarding and Certification) 
Below we separately describe the details for (i) 
‘Onboarding’ for Issuers, Holders and Verifiers, and (ii) how 
Certification works behind the scenes. The companion step of 
(iii) Verification is conceptually similar, and thus provided 
separately in the Supplementary Materials, as are the more 
straightforward descriptions of the server and mobile app 
functional architectures. 
 
1) Onboarding 
There are three entities involved in the operations: Issuers, 
Holders and Verifiers. The onboarding process lets all of them 
install and configure the app. The configuration process for 
each of them is distinct and requires specific documentation. 
Issuers: The onboarding of a potential Issuer (Fig. 3) 
begins with the person downloading and installing the app. 
The app then instructs the Issuer to complete an in-app form. 
Because the Issuer has the ability to test, validate and issue 
certificates to individuals, the app employs two factor 
authentication for all potential Issuers. We anticipate using the 
API provided by the General Pharmaceutical Council, or an 
equivalent, to cross-check the registration and the branch 
information of the likely Issuer (this is simulated in our 
prototype — discussions about API access are underway), 
followed by email verification. The former requires the person 
to input appropriate information into the form, while the latter 
asks the potential Issuer to provide a valid official email 
address at the company’s registered domain name. The app 
sends a special link to that Issuer’s email address to complete 
the registration. Data provided by the potential Issuers resides 
on each Issuer’s Solid Pod. 
Holders: The process of onboarding a Holder (Fig. 4) 
involves adding an identification document such as a driving 
license or passport. The document number is used to generate 
the Decentralized ID (DID) that acts as the anchor for the 
Holder. A potential Holder first downloads and installs the app 
followed by adding a photo of the identification document. 
This document resides in the Holder’s Solid Pod. This photo 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Certification: main dataflows. 
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document is deemed permanent (but remains on their personal 
Solid Pod) and once submitted, cannot be changed again. The 
app then provides the Holder with the DID, leaving the owner 
of the account ready for testing and certification. 
Verifiers: Of the three main roles, the process of 
onboarding Verifiers is the most straightforward. Anyone 
willing to act as a Verifier can download the app and start 
verifying. There is   no need to create an account for verifying 
a Holder’s certificate. As the Verifier submits no data, the 
steps of the Verifier onboarding timeline (Fig. 5) do not 
involve Solid Pods. 
2) Certification 
The certification process requires a Holder to visit an Issuer 
with the exact document used for identification at the time of 
onboarding. At this point the Issuer matches this document 
with the copy stored in the Holder’s Solid Pod, viewing it on 
the app and tapping to accept the ID. The Holder’s photo is 
‘burned’ into the upcoming steps so that at the final step of 
verification, there will be no need to display the same physical 
ID. In Fig. 6, we see the ‘behind the scenes’ view of 
certification, including the Holder’s Solid Pod with the ID.  
The app is designed to work in a completely decentralized 
environment. Its functionalities run across the Issuer’s, 
Holder’s, and Verifier’s phones as well as on the hosting 
servers, but does not have access to any data from a central 
database. Every time the app needs to execute an operation, it 
reads the data from a particular user's Solid Pod (and only 
with the user’s permission). In Fig. 6, at (A) we see that the 
app reads the allowed identity details from the Holder’s Solid 
Pod, and at (B) compares their hash with the corresponding 
hash on the blockchain and confirms this on the Issuer’s phone 
display. 
Once the identity is confirmed, via physical document 
checks and Verifiable Credentials demonstrating ownership of 
the relevant DIDs, the Issuer conducts the antibody test and 
initiates the process of generating a certificate at (C). A 
certificate is a set of data in W3C RDF (Resource Description 
Framework) format [20] containing the test results and a 
Verifiable Credential for the just-tested Holder. While the 
hash of the certificate goes onto the blockchain at (D), the 
original document resides in the Solid Pod (E). It is notable 
that neither the blockchain nor a third-party centralized server 
stores the personal data of the Holder. 
The Holder has the option of keeping a copy of the 
certificate in a cloud server of his or her choice. In the event of 
losing the phone, the Holder can retrieve the data from the 
cloud and restore the certificate in the regenerated local Solid 
Pod of the replacement phone. This certificate is visible on the 
Holder’s app in the form of a QR code, giving an easy-to-scan 
option for Verifiers. 
3) Verification 
The innards of Verification are conceptually similar to what 
we have just shown for Certification and are thus provided 
separately in the Supplementary Materials. 
F. Benchmark testing 
To anticipate scalability, we benchmarked three operations 
(Issuing, Verifying, and Uploading) against a baseline ping 
that simply echoed a response following a request. 
 For both Issuing and Verifying we used two variants, to 
assess the difference between generating hashes (a) locally 
within the mobile phone app and (b) externally on a server 
before adding to the blockchain. The Uploading times are 
purely the times for uploading a certificate to a Solid pod 
stored in the cloud, in case that is the Holder’s preference. 
III. RESULTS  
A. COVID-19 Antibody Test Certification: App characteristics 
Our ‘COVID-19 antibody test certification’ (CAT/VC) app 
builds upon the Verifiable Credentials and Solid frameworks 
described in Section II, plus our own expertise developed over 
the past 5 years in the area of blockchain-based certification 
[21], [22]. The result combines the following characteristics: 
● Wholly resident on the end-user’s smartphone, yet 
usable as a paper-only certificate in appropriate socio-
economic contexts, as described in the Supplementary 
Materials. 
● One-tap scan, display, and verification of antibody test 
results, which are owned by the user. 
● The app only reveals verifiable CAT/VC results 
without revealing any personally sensitive information, 
at the discretion of the user.  
● The details of Verifiable Credentials, Solid Pods, and 
Ethereum blockchain are hidden: from the user’s point 
of view, it is ‘just another app’. 
B. Performance benchmarking results 
Fig. 7 shows the time to completion in seconds (Y axis) of 
all six operations where we sent between 1 and 100 
simultaneous requests (X axis): the fastest (baseline) ping is 
the lowest line. Uploading is the second least expensive 
operation, while Verifying and Issuing are the two most 
expensive operations of our app. The relative difference in 
time between operations involving locally generated hash 
(LH) and server-generated hash (SH) is modest for Issuing 
(6.9% difference between ‘Issuing SH’ and ‘Issuing LH’), but 
more twice that for Verifying (17.1% difference between 
‘Verifying SH and ‘Verifying LH’). This behavior is 
understandable, as Issuing requires writing on the blockchain 
through transactions (i.e. the method that allows adding an 
entry to the distributed ledger) while Verifying involves only a 
look up at a particular ledger entry. 
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Linear growth for all operations indicates that our 
architecture is capable of handling scale-up without surprise: 
there is simply no inter-node or inter-app communication or 
interaction overhead, so by improving the configuration of the 
common infrastructures in the architecture, such as any Solid 
cloud server, blockchain node, or any other intermediate 
element, the architecture can serve more parallel requests, i.e. 
reduce the response time. Additional results are discussed in 
the Supplementary Materials.  
IV. DISCUSSION  
A. Deployment, integration, and scale 
Our focus is on trusted certification, and for this reason we 
remain committed to deployments involving nationally 
approved locations such as pharmacies or UK National Health 
Service surgeries rather than home testing (off-site lab tests 
are described in the Supplementary Materials).  With our 
approach, deploying the decentralized servers requires another 
dozen or so Consortium members in addition to the five 
already engaged, plus about two days of training, which can 
be handled in parallel for all Consortium members via 
webinars, as we already do in our current work with 
blockchain-based educational certification [23]. The mobile 
phone app itself requires just a download and less than 30 
minutes of training for Issuers, and even less for Verifiers and 
Holders – we anticipate developing a video tutorial for all 
scenarios. More significantly is the ‘buy-in’ i.e. acceptance by 
certified pharmacies and, in the UK, the National Health 
Service, and integration with existing work practice, ethics 
guideline approval, and agreement about what, if any, data 
needs to be stored centrally (no central storage is required at 
all by our approach).  For a full-scale rollout, it would be 
necessary to further stress-test our prototype along the lines 
we have already started as described in the preceding Sections.  
The technology itself is inherently scalable as our Results 
section shows: transactions on the Consortium blockchain 
typically take under 5 seconds to be confirmed after entry by 
the Issuer, after which other steps such as verification are 
subjectively instantaneous. This scales well, as the architecture 
is inherently distributed across both servers (blockchain 
nodes) and mobile phone apps. Collaborative possibilities are 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Time to issue up to 100 parallel requests for ‘Issuing’ (SH=Server Hash and LH=Local Hash), ‘Verifying’ (SH=Server Hash and LH=Local Hash) 
and Uploading of Solid Pod data, vs baseline standard ‘Ping’. 
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promising, as new initiatives in this niche are rapidly 
emerging [24]. 
B. Beyond antibody test certification 
Our scenario highlights antibody testing, but the technology 
is identical for vaccination certification, as we describe in the 
Supplementary Materials — this may prove even more 
popular once vaccines have been suitably tested and approved 
[6], [7].  The app and decentralized server architecture are 
readily scalable and applicable generically.  For example,  
• People could demonstrate that they are eligible to use 
different methods of transport or to visit public places 
such as libraries, theaters, or holiday destinations. 
• Utility/building/repair staff seeking access to a place of 
residence, even in ‘normal’ healthy times, could ‘prove 
their roles’. 
• More generally, the entire area of ‘Decentralized 
Verifiable Personal Health Records’, as described in 
[25], particularly if augmented by the W3C Verifiable 
Credentials standard [12], can benefit from the 
approach described herein. 
C. Ethics 
New technologies bring new challenges for society. 
Commentators have argued (e.g. in [8], [9], [26]), that 
certification of the type we have envisaged, even when totally 
private and tamper-proof, would entail multiple risks, notably: 
(a) disenfranchising the poor and others who do not have 
access to the technology or the tests, or have access but ‘fail’ 
the test, and (b) becoming a stepping-stone for future 
governments to deploy the same concept either to enable or to 
enforce discrimination based on immunity and other arbitrary 
conditions.  To avoid this technology becoming ‘weaponized’ 
for discriminatory purposes, we advocate several measures 
including optional rather than mandatory use, adherence with 
UK NHS Information Governance guidelines [27], [28] and 
oversight by an Ethics Committee. This issue is analyzed in 
detail in the Supplementary Materials. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The perceived need for a COVID-19 Antibody Test / 
Vaccination Certificate, if shown to be biologically robust and 
to conform to proposed ethical guidelines, has motivated us to 
develop a mobile phone app based around Verifiable 
Credentials, distributed storage of cryptographic public/key 
pairs, and the decentralized verification of data with 
confidentiality.  This has enabled us to provide a facility that 
is ‘just another app’ from the viewpoint of the end-user, 
healthcare professionals, employers and other relevant 
authorities — thereby providing a tamper-proof record owned 
entirely by the end-user, and allowing the end-user selectively 
to reveal solely the proof of test results without surrendering 
other personal information (e.g. age, address, blood type, other 
discovered antibodies or immune deficiencies or other 
inadvertent revelations in the data set, for which certificate 
Holders may have no idea how this information might be used 
by someone else in the future), and requiring only mobile 
phone app downloads from everyone in the loop.  This app 
and its secure digital certificate thus become a powerful 
adjunct/enhancement to traditional paper-based certification 
from the NHS or Pharmaceutical testing authorities — and 
without the need for the costly installation of special ‘e-ticket 
reader’ hardware: the same mobile phone app is sufficient for 
the task at hand, regardless of which of the three roles is 
involved. Many other uses of secure and private certification 
via mobile phone app and decentralized servers are 
additionally made possible, and our infrastructure can be 
embedded into any other app or web portal through APIs. 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Our companion document includes: Introduction — more 
about ‘The premise of immunity’; Methods — (a) how we 
achieve robust privacy; (b) more details about how 
Verification works and the functional architecture and mobile 
phone app infrastructure; (c) scenario variations for  (i) ‘Issue 
Digital Certificate Without Photo ID’, (ii) ‘Issue Paper 
Certificate’, (iii) ‘Off-Site Test Via External Lab’, and (iv) 
‘Vaccination + Certification’; Results — additional aspects of 
system performance; Discussion — further observations about 
rollout and ethical issues. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
N this supplementary paper we first discuss the underlying 
premise of immunity, and then, in the Methods section, 
provide details of how we deal with privacy and the design 
of key aspects of onboarding, and verification. In the Results 
section, we describe additional considerations involved in the 
system’s performance. In the Discussion section, we expand 
on rollout and the complex ethical issues raised by the 
research.  
The premise of immunity: Throughout most of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
has advocated a ‘test-isolate-trace’ approach [29]. In parallel, 
there has been a worldwide cooperative effort to develop a 
vaccine [6] and to develop numerous serological tests for the 
presence of antibodies [30]. If immunity is strongly implied by 
the outcomes of these latter tests, then individuals could be 
allowed to get back to work, particularly in healthcare and 
other key areas [2], [3]. The WHO initially warned that the 
very premise of COVID-19 immunity was itself uncertain 
[31]. Yet the fast pace of research is already showing 
promising signs that early testing was flawed, the presence of 
antibodies in recovered individuals has been confirmed, and 
re-infection now seems increasingly unlikely [32], [33]. True, 
some immunologists have argued that COVID-19 immunity 
could be very weak, because ‘reinfection is an issue with the 
four seasonal coronaviruses that cause about 10% to 30% of 
common colds’ [34]. But others in that same discussion argue 
that immunity could be valid for ‘a year or two’, a view shared 
by Male, who with Golding and Bootman has written a clear 
exposition on the life-cycle of infection, antibody detection, 
and likely immunity to COVID-19 [5]. A related challenge is 
the quality of the testing: test sensitivity (% positive detection 
for the right antibodies, so high sensitivity means few false 
positives) and specificity (% negatives correctly detected, so 
high specificity means few false negatives) are undergoing 
great scrutiny even as we write this [35], and are naturally a 
matter of concern, because they must be sufficiently high to 
make the approach worthwhile.  In the meantime, our research 
aims to find an approach to achieve highly robust certification, 
so that it is ready to deploy as-and-when the ongoing 
biological research satisfies the necessary quality criteria. 
II. METHODS 
A. The design of robust privacy 
Several important guidelines concerning privacy were set 
out by the Sovrin Foundation, a nonprofit organisation with 
over 70 corporate partners including IBM, Cisco and others, 
which has the aim of ‘driving greater interoperability and a 
new trust model for securely sharing private information’ [36]. 
We adopt a variation of the three principles set out in the 
Sovrin.org White Paper [37], modifying their item 2 as shown 
below. 
1) Pairwise-unique DIDs and public keys 
As Sovrin.org explains, ‘Imagine that when you open a new 
account with an online merchant, instead of giving them a 
credit card number or phone number, you gave them a DID 
created just for them. They could still use this DID to contact 
you about your order, or to charge you a monthly 
subscription, but not for anything else. If […] your DID were 
compromised in any way, you would just cancel it and give 
them a new one—without affecting any other relationship. 
[consequently…] a pairwise-pseudonymous DID is not worth 
stealing.’ [37] 
2) Minimum and Encoded Data Storage / User’s Choice 
According to [37], no private data should be stored on the 
ledger, even in hashed form, to make it future-attack-proof. 
Sovrin accepts, as do we, the need for pseudonymous 
identifiers (DIDs), pseudonymous public keys, and agent 
addresses (e.g. the mobile phone app endpoints) to be stored in 
a decentralized ledger, but in addition we offer the user a 
choice regarding whether and where to host personal 
information (mobile phone, favorite cloud provider, or both), 
plus the barest minimum for verification purposes, namely 
hashes (irreversible encodings) of private data. This has the 
following benefits:  
• Serves as a user-storage ‘vault’ for later recovery in 
case of loss.  
• This ‘vault’ (i.e. the Solid Pod) can reside on the user’s 
phone, or on a favorite cloud provider, or both — it is 
always the user’s choice. 
• To facilitate later independent verification, it uses a 
blockchain with distributed nodes run by a Consortium 
of trusted providers so that there is neither a single 
point of failure nor a single ‘owner’ even of the hash of 
the certificate. 
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• Even so, it only stores a hash on the Consortium 
blockchain — a non-reversible but provably correct 
encoding of the certificate rather than the certificate 
itself.  
This is a powerful privacy-preserving and tamper-proof 
approach that we call Minimum and Encoded Data Storage / 
User’s Choice. Verborgh [38] has a deeper discussion of the 
nature and importance of these types of emerging paradigm 
shifts. 
3) Selective disclosure  
It is essential that users (certificate Holders) should only 
have to reveal just the portions of their own personally-held 
private data that are relevant to specific transactions (e.g. 
proving that you are 18 years of age or older, in order to make 
certain purchases or access certain locations, but without 
revealing your actual age or date of birth). This is made 
possible by the technology known as cryptographic zero 
knowledge proofs [39-41], so named because they provide, to 
the Verifier who wishes to know, proof of something specific 
(such as ‘Age ≥ 18’), but with the Verifier having no 
knowledge of any other details, in this case actual age or date 
of birth. The ‘secret sauce’ of zero knowledge proofs, as 
illustrated in [40], [41], is that a mathematical function works 
through a proof of some fact (such as age being greater than or 
equal to X, or the existence of a certain credential), in such a 
way that the actual steps involved in executing the proof only 
reach a positive outcome if the fact is true (for example, the 
positive outcome may require a certain number of steps to 
execute): so the proof is valid, but still only indirect (e.g. 
counting the steps executed) without touching the raw data 
[39], [40]. 
B. Verification and implementation details 
This section describes the operations that underpin the 
functioning verification, as well as the overall implementation 
infrastructure and mobile phone app. 
1) Verification 
The process of verifying a certificate is an on-demand 
action. A Verifier cannot validate a certificate unless 
requested. It requires a Holder to go to a Verifier for this 
purpose. A Verifier can be an employer or other individual or 
organisation to whom the Holder wants or needs to present the 
certificate. Fig. S1 shows the main data flows involved in 
Verification. 
In Fig. S1, we see that once requested, at (A), the app reads 
the QR code from the Holder’s phone. This QR code (which is 
generated from the data that itself is stored in the Solid Pod) 
has two components: the certificate and a URL pointing to the 
hash on the blockchain. At (B), the app extracts these 
components and at (C) locally generates a temporary hash of 
the certificate. Finally (D), the app fetches the hash stored on 
the blockchain and compares it with the local hash. The 
matching of the hashes indicates the validity and the 
 
 
 
 
Fig. S1. Verification: main dataflows. 
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authenticity of the certificate stored in the Solid Pod of the 
Holder. At the same time, the physical identity of the Holder 
can be confirmed by the Verifier via the Holder’s photo ID 
which will already have been ‘burned’ into the mobile phone 
app certificate. The digital identity of the Holder can be 
confirmed by verifying the Verifiable Credential (embedded in 
the certificate) based on the relevant Holder DID. 
2) The functional infrastructure 
The components of our implementation communicate with 
each other via current Web standards — Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol Secure (HTTPS), RDF (primarily in the JSON-LD 
format), Verifiable Credentials, and Decentralized Identifiers 
— and via blockchain protocols (specifically, Ethereum 
protocols). The volumes of data and computational 
requirements are typically small and can be handled by a 
mobile device (full blockchain nodes are an exception, due to 
the potential size of the full chain data). 
The main software functions required by the 
implementation are as follows: 
 
Generate QR codes: Implemented using standard 
libraries to generate QR codes for identity and 
immunity certificates.  
Generate hashes: Using standard libraries, 
certificates are transformed into a canonical RDF 
format before hashing, in order to ensure robust 
reproducibility of hashes, for verification.  
Communicate with Blockchain: The Parity library is 
used to communicate with our Consortium 
blockchain.  
A light client library can handle read/write 
interactions with the blockchain without requiring a 
phone to maintain a full copy of the blockchain. 
Communicate with Solid Pods: Communication with 
Solid takes place using the Solid REST API [42], to 
read and write personal data regarding the Holder to 
and from their Solid Pod with user permission.  
Manage Issuer and Holder Credentials: Issuer and 
Holder credentials are stored in public/private key 
wallets containing DIDs. The authorization for an 
Issuer to create certificates can be represented as a 
Verifiable Credential issued by the relevant 
regulatory authority to the Issuer, which any 
participating party can verify. Currently we use 
Streetcred ID [43] to generate DIDs for the Issuers, 
Holders and Certificates.  
Generate Verifiable Credentials: Certificates are 
created at issue time, and their contents asserted as 
the Claim elements in Verifiable Credentials to be 
stored in the Holder’s Solid Pod, with metadata 
describing the relevant blockchain records forming 
the Proof. This provides a sharable data structure 
which permits anyone to check its authenticity. 
 
3) The mobile phone app 
Fig. S2 shows representative screen shots of the mobile 
 
 
Fig. S2. Representative screen shots of the running mobile app showing (A) home screen, (B) multiple routes for login for the three main roles, just about to 
tap on ‘Issuer’, (C) about to issue the certificate having already scanned the user’s ID number, displayed at the top, (D) certificate QR code, ready to be 
scanned by the Holder’s mobile phone app. 
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phone app, which provides all the necessary UI elements for 
the Issuer, Holder and Verifier to perform their actions. At the 
time of writing, the main functionalities of the mobile phone 
app include the ability to scan and generate QR codes and 
generate hashes for text and images. For the QR code scan and 
generate functions to work, the mobile phone app is packed 
with necessary libraries to support QR code functions and only 
works on smartphones with built-in camera functionality. The 
mobile phone app also contains the hashing libraries. As the 
mobile phone app needs to communicate with a server, an 
active internet connection is necessary for HTTPS server calls.  
For speed of implementation for the current prototype, a 
Node.js Express server does all the heavy lifting for the app, 
with the functionalities explained above. This is a temporary 
solution, however, given the urgency of the current situation. 
C. Scenario variations 
Throughout the paper we have focused on a scenario 
involving ‘On-Site Test for Antibodies + Issuance of Digital 
Certificate Including Photo ID’, but there are some key 
variations easily incorporated into our design, namely (i) 
‘Issuing Digital Certificate Without Photo ID’, (ii) ‘Issuing 
Paper Certificate’, (iii) ‘Off-Site Testing Via External Lab’, 
and (iv) ‘Vaccination + Certification’, described in turn below. 
1) Variation 1: Issuing Digital Certificate Without Photo ID 
In our scenario in the main paper, Fig. 2, the Issuer 
(Pharmacy) needs to authenticate that the Holder is who they 
say they are, and thus requests that the Holder display both a 
physical ID, such as a Driving License or a Passport and also a 
QR code which is scanned by the Issuer using the Issuer’s 
mobile phone app.  At this point there is in fact a choice: the 
Issuer can either (a) tap to accept the ID, in which case the 
Holder’s photo will be ‘burned’ into the upcoming steps so 
that at the final step of verification, there will be no need to 
display the same physical ID, or (b) leave the Holder to 
display the physical ID once again at verification time. 
If path (b) is chosen, there are other implications. At 
Verification time, to avoid someone else impersonating the 
Holder, the Holder must present not only the certificate, but 
also some proof of identity. In this variation, the Verifier can 
confirm the identity of the Holder by visually inspecting a 
physical ID card, and separately scanning the Holder’s 
presented QR code (without ID incorporated) to verify just the 
certificate.  
2) Variation 2: Issuing Paper Certificate 
At step 2 of our main scenario, the test certificate can in fact 
be provided purely on paper, which has a dual purpose for the 
Holder: (a) a fallback in case of mobile phone failure; (b) a 
‘tech-agnostic’ option which enables us to provide 
certification in a more appropriate manner for cases of socio-
economic deprivation. This alternative means that some of the 
advantage of digital certification will be missing, but the use 
of printed QR codes which include the image of the Holder are 
still a useful advance over plain paper certificates. It also 
provides an alternative for individuals with little access to 
technology, but for whom a paper-based QR code printout can 
serve as a ‘good enough’ and ‘effectively tamper-proof’ 
certificate.  
3) Variation 3: Off-Site Testing Via External Lab 
It is likely that in many cases, particularly where large 
volume or high-quality serology testing is required, the 
Holder’s blood sample has to be sent to a separate lab for 
processing. In this variation, the Pharmacist can issue a 
certificate that is flagged as being in a ‘pending’ state. The lab 
technician will also have a login to the app, via an additional 
button on the login screen, and see the list of pending 
certificates waiting for processing and approval. Once the lab 
technician has the results for a blood sample, the technician 
has to scan the QR code attached to the sample (this 
incorporates the Holder’s digital ID, but with no personal 
information exposed to the lab technician) and then tap a 
button to issue the certified results to the relevant Holder. At 
this point, the Holder receives a notification with details of the 
certified result. 
Note that the steps in this variation are just like the steps in 
‘supply chain provenance’ gaining increasing traction in the 
blockchain ‘farm-to-fork’ world, typified by the IBM Food 
Trust [44]. Such efforts are also gaining ground in the area of 
vaccine supply chain provenance [45].  At each step of the 
chain, each participant adds the information pertinent to their 
niche, and digitally signs, while cross-checking automatically 
for authenticity of provenance at earlier steps in the supply 
chain.  For blood samples, both the issuer and lab technician 
would add serial numbers and details for the blood sample and 
containers, syringes as necessary, and respective registration 
numbers / IDs for their roles as pharmacist and lab technician.  
At Verifier stage, and even for the lab test manufacturer, 
similar procedures would be deployed so that the integrity of 
the whole testing life cycle was ensured. 
4) Variation 4: Vaccination + Certification 
Although the most forward-looking variation (because 
vaccine research, development, approval, and deployment may 
take the longest [6]), it fits very smoothly into our existing 
scenario life cycles.  Essentially, the Issuer as described 
throughout the main section of the paper becomes the person 
administering the vaccination jab (as opposed to taking a 
blood sample), and certifying that this has happened in the 
same manner described for the antibody test certificate.  The 
approach to ‘supply chain provenance’ discussed in the 
preceding paragraph also applies to this variation, because the 
Issuer will have to include details of the vaccination source 
and batch within the certificate. 
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III. RESULTS 
Fig. S3 shows the number of operations per second 
(opps/sec) for Issuing, Verifying, Uploading, and Pinging, 
calculated from the slope of the 1-100 parallel operations 
timing described in the main paper.  It demonstrates that while 
the current configuration is constant, our architecture can 
serve about five certificate issuances per second. For 
verifications, although we experimented with both local and 
server variants, in practice the hash will be generated locally 
(within the mobile phone app), giving us the ability to verify 
about six certificates per second with the existing 
infrastructure. 
This observation shows us that the operations of Issuing and 
Verifying are twice as expensive as the simplest server ping. 
Except for some common infrastructure, the architecture is 
decentralized, i.e. one issuer issues (or verifier verifies) one 
certificate using one smartphone at a time even if we have 
hundreds of thousands of parallel requests. Even some 
commonly held infrastructure can be more distributed, such as 
the Solid pods. In this experiment, we used just one Solid 
cloud server for all requests, but in practice, users will have 
their Solid pod hosted on multiple servers or their own mobile 
phone. Therefore, if only those common and fixed 
infrastructures are scaled up, or load-balancing is applied to 
divert requests over multiple machines, performance time will 
significantly improve, with a concomitant speedup of Issuing 
and Verification not requiring architectural re-design. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. More about rollout 
The architecture presented in the main paper and 
Supplementary Material above is all built on standard library 
modules, and therefore joining a Consortium blockchain to 
help roll this out at scale is relatively straightforward, subject 
to suitable testing and deployment. The key hurdles are 
primarily Issuer credentials and the critical mass of the 
Consortium blockchain. In the case of Issuer credentials, we 
mentioned in section II.E.1 about Onboarding that we use two 
factor authentication for Issuers, and an API provided by the 
General Pharmaceutical Council to cross-check registration — 
this of course is subject to approval, and relevant discussions 
are already underway.  As for the Consortium blockchain, a 
strong Consortium of industrial and academic partners needs 
to be established, after which addition of new members is just 
a matter of approval by the existing Consortium and the 
distribution of training and instruction materials. 
Alternatively, ‘parallel’ consortia can be created by cloning 
our approach. Given related ongoing work [24] that we 
mentioned in the main paper, we are optimistic that critical 
mass can be achieved. 
B.  Ethical considerations 
It should be clear from the previous sections that the 
concepts underlying Verifiable Credentials and the 
Decentralized Verification of Data with Confidentiality are 
diametrically opposed to any kind of central data storage or 
‘Big Brother’-style snooping and data collection, and indeed 
provide excellent and agreed standards for avoiding such 
snooping and data collection. To be clear, in the approach we 
advocate in this paper,   
Personally identifiable information is stored entirely under 
the Holder’s control (on a mobile phone, on the Holder’s 
cloud provider of choice, or both), and additionally for 
later verification purposes in minimal (a few bytes) 
encoded form (hash) on a Consortium blockchain. 
Moreover, the app allows the user selectively to present 
only the specific test result, with no other personal 
information revealed. 
 
How is it possible that no personal information is stored in a 
database? What about the certificate itself? That’s the beauty 
of Verifiable Credentials, Zero Knowledge Proofs and our 
approach of Minimum and Encoded Data Storage / User’s 
Choice: taken together, this combined approach offers 
cryptographically signed, verifiable, un-tamperable proof that 
the certificate being shown was really granted by a known 
testing authority to the person in question, even without 
showing the name, address, phone number or even UK NHS 
number of the person holding it.  
Everything in this app is decentralized. Anyone wishing to 
abandon involvement in this kind of certification can just 
delete the Verifiable Credentials stored on their Solid Pods. 
There will be no records whatsoever, as if they had never been 
on the system. Deleting data on the Solid Pods will also turn 
the hashes on the blockchain into ‘orphans’ (no data pointing 
to the hash), i.e. the hashes will become meaningless: it is not 
possible to recover the original data from a hash. 
This almost-too-good-to-be-true approach does raise a fresh 
concern, raised briefly in the main paper: the same techniques 
we are advocating seem to open up what we call the ‘Private 
Verifiable Credentials Paradox’: your digital mobile phone 
app certificate is so much more private and tamper-proof than 
the old paper or database versions that it could (deliberately or 
accidentally), be weaponized for discrimination against your 
fellow citizens. In other words, a potential problem, according 
to critics, is not that the architecture is too weak, but that it is 
too strong. 
 
Fig. S3. Operations per second for Issuing (Server vs Local hashing), 
Verifying’ (Server vs Local hashing), Uploading and (baseline) ‘Pinging’. 
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Clearly, the more powerful methods of today and tomorrow 
have the potential to open up a Pandora's Box of Bad Use, if 
not by the modern democracies in which we may have grown 
up, then by some authority in another time or place - as the 
world has witnessed all too tragically in the past.  We started 
this project with the noble aim of facilitating a way to get 
people back to work and heading towards recovery from the 
devastating impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic of 
2019/2020. If COVID-19 antibodies can indeed be shown 
reliably to confer immunity, and the overwhelming support for 
the ‘test-test-test’ mantra of the World Health Organization 
continues to hold, then people are going to get tested, in 
overwhelming numbers, and certificates are going to be issued 
in one form or another. 
But we are not adopting a ‘give-up-and-accept-our-fate-in-
the-hands-of-bad-actors’ approach. Yes, a secure digital 
certificate could hypothetically be weaponized to a greater 
degree than a paper one, but the actual degree could be 
something of a mind-set illusion. Any certification method has 
such potential, and therefore, rather than casting the 
technology in terms of ‘good vs evil’ we think our approach is 
best considered as something that involves a trade-off between 
(a) the advantages of getting people back to work using good 
privacy-preserving fraud-prevention methods and (b) the 
disadvantages of discriminatory (mis)use of such methods.  
Our approach to this trade-off is strongly to nudge things 
towards (a), and therefore we propose the following concrete 
steps to achieve this: 
• App usage should be strictly opt-in/optional: a paper 
certificate must always be allowed by default, just as 
with, say, train or airline tickets. This helps introduce 
the concept and technology in a gentle manner: people 
will ultimately decide what they prefer for themselves. 
• Implementations must comply with UK NHS 
Information Governance (IG) guidelines [27], [28]. 
Compliance should in principle be straightforward, 
because (a) in our approach, personally identifiable 
information is stored entirely under the Holder’s 
control, and additionally for later verification purposes 
in minimal hash-encoded form on a Consortium 
blockchain, and (b) the app allows the user selectively 
to present only the specific test result, with no other 
personal information revealed. Even so, the UK NHS 
IG documents provide a strong guiding framework for 
ensuring continuing compliance, particularly with 
respect to relevant EU GDPR requirements such as 
‘Right to erasure’ and ‘Right to data portability’: our 
architecture by its very design avoids database storage 
of personally identifiable information, but oversight of 
possible misuse/abuse of this and related technologies 
needs to be maintained, as the next three bullet points 
suggest. 
• COVID-19 Antibody Test Certificates should only be 
applied to workers in healthcare and other comparable 
key sectors, as defined by the appropriate UK 
Parliamentary process (for example, the list of key 
exceptions to mandatory business closure during the 
current pandemic was specified by the UK Ministry of 
Housing, Communities, and Local Government), with 
input from an Ethics Committee mentioned next. 
• An Ethics Committee, comparable in scope and 
composition to the UK NHS Research Ethics 
Committees, should have oversight of actual 
deployment of the approach advocated herein. 
• The approach should be reviewed on a 3-monthly basis.  
 
Ethical standards are challenging to uphold, but uphold 
them we must, as we see this as the best way to negotiate a 
path towards a ‘pandemic end game’ in a manner acceptable 
to the widest possible audience. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Will such an app be suitable as part of a ‘pandemic exit 
strategy’ for helping get people back to work in key sectors? 
There are many issues to be addressed first, including the 
rigorous scrutiny and approval of antibody tests, likelihood 
and longevity of immunity, agreement concerning ethical 
oversight, and acceptance by the public. Our approach is 
intended to ensure that the procedures for creating tamper-
proof, verifiable, privacy-preserving certificates are ‘ready to 
go’ while waiting for antibody/immunity tests to achieve the 
required state of robustness and acceptance. We believe that, 
just as with train e-tickets, end-users will ‘vote with their feet’ 
and deploy the app in large numbers once its benefits have 
been demonstrated. To take a stance against what we call the 
‘Pandora’s Box of Bad Use’, we proposed ethical guidelines at 
the end of the Discussion, which we believe are essential for 
the principled development and deployment of the prototype 
described in this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
